Resolution Adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of the Communist Preparation Organization, October 14, 2026
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With the Al-Aqsa Flood, a new era of class struggle commenced at the global level. Prior to the Al-Aqsa Flood, the coordinates of class struggles in every country of the world were determined by the conditions that had prevailed globally in the aftermath of the collapse of the socialist camp at the beginning of the 1990s. Despite the crises and wars that occurred throughout the world over the last four decades, the fundamentals underpinning the status quo remained intact. During this period, a consensus prevailed that the order dominating all societies in every part of the world would be the same capitalist order. Disagreement centered solely on the weight and stature of the capitalist system, or on whether the fate of society as a whole should be abandoned to the invisible hand of the free market. Neither the crisis of the tech bubbles at the beginning of the second millennium nor the global crisis of 2008–2009 caused any disruption to the foundations of this consensus.
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Along these two lines of division concerning the role of the market or the state, global disputes—both within the dominant bloc of world capitalism and beyond it—took the form of a contest between the advocates of the globalization of capital and of abandoning the world's fate to international capital, on the one hand, and the advocates of protecting national spheres of accumulation against the onslaught of international capital, on the other. The course of these disputes shaped the political sphere of every country.
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The hallmark of this entire era, and what distinguished it from the twentieth century, was the absence of an alternative belonging to the principal producing class of the capitalist order—the working class. This alternative, which emerged in the nineteenth century in the form of communism and, through a process of disclosure and evolution, assumed first the form of socialist workers' parties in Europe and subsequently the form of communism arising from the October Revolution until the beginning of the 1990s, had become a cornerstone of international relations. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and, subsequently, of the socialist camp, it vanished and played no role in class struggles. All varieties of socialism of the last four decades, without exception, were situated within the frameworks of types of socialism belonging to non-working classes. Alongside the known and longstanding types of non-working-class socialism, such as bourgeois socialism or religious socialism, the last four decades witnessed new types of non-working-class socialism that were fundamentally and principally formed by new social strata, together with the emergence of new informatics technologies, the digital economy, and the development of communications in cyberspace—types of socialism in which everything was front and center except the class question: from the environment and LGBTQ+ individuals to animals and migrants. The communist or socialist parties remaining from the previous era likewise acquiesced to the hegemony of liberalism in its various forms, either dissolving into the new classless socialisms or, within the rigid world of their past dreams, retreating ever further into their shells and gradually turning into negligible individuals.
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Until the Al-Aqsa Flood, all the uprisings of the post-Cold War era bearing the mark of the working and toiling classes—whether the millions-strong strikes in India or the brilliant Yellow Vests movement in France—ultimately remained within the framework of this era and proved unable to break its boundaries or pose ground-breaking questions. At the programmatic level, the absolute dominance of ideas and opinions grounded in the sanctity of the market stood as an impassable barrier in the path of these movements. At the ideological and political level, the notion of smashing the state apparatus and replacing it with a new one did not appear even in the most distant dreams, let alone in practical politics. No movement—absolutely none—in any part of the world over the past four decades found the courage to propose such a perspective, nor showed any sign of embarking upon such a path. Gaza took a step along this path from both directions and thus became the pioneer and vanguard of entry into the new era of proletarian revolutions.
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Gaza's entry into the new era of class struggle did not come out of nowhere. Nor was this development the product of the will of the organizers of the heroic uprising of October 7. Rather, that organization and its leaders were themselves the product of a protracted schism within the economic, political, and ideological structures of Palestine, Israel, the Middle East, and the world. From the establishment of the terrorist state of Israel until the Al-Aqsa Flood, Israel underwent qualitative changes in its class structures and in the ideological frameworks of Zionism, and so too did Palestine. For Palestine in particular, these changes amounted to nothing less than the transition from one era of historical evolution to another.
The Zionist state of the occupiers was initially created as a project of colonial socialism, one pillar of which was occupation and genocide and the other Jewish collectivism. It was a project that enjoyed the greatest sympathies within the international socialist movement, and its kibbutzim and collective farms were for a long period regarded as the ideal model of leftist intellectuals in the West. By contrast, the Palestinian society remaining from the Ottoman Caliphate was a rural society with a pre-capitalist economy and a population composed mainly of peasants and farmers, alongside a small segment of urban society—including notables integrated into the Ottoman bureaucracy—who everywhere acted as representatives of the Palestinian people. To the same extent that Zionist Israel was considered a symbol of progressivism, Palestine was considered a symbol of backwardness and barbarism. The Palestinian resistance, although it formed from the heart of that small urban society, was above all the expression of the will of its large rural population for the land and ancestral home.
Seven decades later, everything had changed. The socialist Zionism of the early occupiers had given way to Zionist fascism, and the Palestinian resistance had risen tall on the shoulders of the Palestinian proletariat. The destruction of Palestine's agricultural structures by the occupiers and the transformation of Palestinians into cheap labor without any rights for Israeli capital had changed Palestinian society from a rural society into a fundamentally proletarian one. Perhaps nowhere in the world did such a high percentage of the population consist of a proletariat lacking any means of production and selling its labor power. This fundamental change was likewise manifested in the structure of struggles. The former fedayeen, organized and trained in training camps in friendly Arab countries, gave way to the intifada of urban youth within Palestine itself. It was this Palestinian proletariat that was placed at the front and center of the struggle.
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With the far-right government of Israel, the development of global capitalism, and the influx of second-class Jewish immigrants from African countries, the European socialist elite ruling within the Zionist camp was on the one hand giving way to apocalyptic fascist Zionists, while on the other hand, with the demise of prospects for long-term prosperity and full employment, Palestinian labor was becoming an unneeded surplus. To the same extent that Israeli capital became indistinguishable from international capital and Israel appeared as a military unit of international concerns, Palestine was positioned as a focal point of the global proletariat in opposition to it. The struggle of this proletariat was no longer merely a struggle for land; it was a fight for the right to live—the most fundamental struggle of the proletariat within the capitalist system.
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The structural transformation of Palestinian society could not fail to be reflected in its political and ideological structure. Following the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon and Syria and its relocation to Tunisia, the two principal axes of this transformation were, first, the transfer of the center of gravity of the struggle to Palestine itself, and second, a shift in the dominant ideological perspective from the nationalism and leftism of the PLO era to Hamas and subsequently Islamic Jihad. Specifically, Hamas, as the largest Islamist organization and the alternative to the organizations arrayed within the PLO—which had initially also enjoyed Israel's support and assistance—constituted, through its focus on social and charitable affairs, a practically two-sided response to the Palestine question. On the one hand, it was a response to the Palestinian nationalism and leftism entrenched in the PLO, and from this perspective it was approved and even supported by extremist Zionist centers. Simultaneously, Hamas was a response to the destruction of the traditional structures of Palestine's rural economy and to the growth of an urban population in need of assistance. The needs of this growing urban population found their reflection in the transformation of Hamas from a fundamentalist religious organization within the framework of the traditional Muslim Brotherhood movement and in opposition to the Protocols of Zion into an organization grounded in politics for securing the interests of the broad foundations of the toiling masses and the young generation of Gaza. Especially after its victory in the 2006 elections, the course of transformation within Hamas—from a military movement with a bigoted religious-charitable ideology—continued at greater speed and finally assumed its definitive form through the publication of various identity documents on the one hand and the transfer of the organization's political center of gravity from Qatar to within Gaza on the other. Now, on one side of Palestinian society stood the disgraceful autonomous government of Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, which, as Israel's gendarme, had taken upon itself the task of maintaining order in the West Bank, while on the other side Hamas gradually stood at the center of a broad coalition encompassing radical left currents to Islamic Jihad—a coalition that was the true reflection of the will of the vast majority of the Palestinian people. A majority that had become the proletariat of Israel and now, after the economic crisis and structural changes of global capitalism, had become a surplus force that had to be expelled.
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The transformation within Hamas was not merely a transformation of an Islamist Palestinian organization. It was part of a transformation unfolding across all the Islamic movements of the region. What distinguished the Palestinian transformation was its pace. The principal component of this transformation was the rift forming within all these movements along class lines. An organization that had been formed as an alternative to Palestinian leftist organizations gradually shed its rigid ideological shell and was becoming an organization in which the class structure of the vast masses lacking any means of production found its reflection in its politics and ideology. This likewise entailed the sidelining or marginalization of the currently dominant current. Here the original movement was splitting into two opposing poles, one end of which was committed to the powers that be in the region—the Arab sheikhs and big capitalists—and the other to the proletarian people of Palestine. The civil war in Syria displayed clear signs of this rift in the support of the dominant current outside the country—Hamas—for Al-Qaeda insurgents, and in the opposition of Hamas's political leadership inside Gaza to this orientation. To the same extent that the Hamas leadership in Qatar sought integration into the dominant global order, Yahya Sinwar became the symbol of a departure from the dominant order as a whole.
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On this basis, the metamorphosis of Hamas up to October 7, 2023—from an organization initially supported by the most extremist Zionist tendencies to an organization symbolizing the negation of the Zionist state, from an organization formed with Israel's financial and logistical assistance to an organization that launched the war for the destruction of Israel with tunnels and gliders—was not merely a change of course within a single organization. It was a turn within the Islamic movements of the entire region, most eloquently manifested in Hamas. All other Islamic movements as well, whether those that, like Iran, succeeded in seizing power or those that participated in state power, were situated along the course of this same evolution. In all of them too, the original Islamic movement was morphing, with greater or lesser speed, into tendencies separated from one another and hostile to each other. The class structure of the different societies, the balance between classes, and the varying historical and cultural contexts determined the manner of this course of metamorphosis in different countries, but in its final outcome no change was brought about. In Iran, the Islamic Republic, with the formation of its powerful civil society, witnessed the remnants of justice-seeking tendencies within the Islamic movement up to the point of the war either transformed or completely marginalized. In Lebanon, the fragile political balance prevented the open unfolding of contradictions within the Islamic movement, and the course of the rift within it remained hidden. Only in Gaza, up to the point of the Al-Aqsa Flood, was this internal balance tipped in favor of militant and justice-seeking tendencies. This is not a finished process, and its gains are not irreversible. The advance or retreat of each of these fronts can at the same time lead to a fundamental change in the balance of forces among the hostile tendencies within the Islamic movements themselves. The balance that exists today can collapse entirely tomorrow. The isolated aristocratic current within Hamas can, with the continuation of genocide, marginalize the radical current following Sinwar's line, and vice versa: the street movement in Iran can sweep away the dominant aristocratic-oligarchic current within the state Islamic movement. In any case, no change will occur in the foundation of this process. The outcome of all these movements, whether in a governing position or in an opposition position, will be nothing other than the continuation of the bifurcation into two opposing poles: a pole that seeks integration into the dominant global order, and a pole that will aim at the negation of the foundations of this order.
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The historical content of this upheaval is nothing other than the process of transformation of the Islamic movements during the transition to capitalism. From movements opposed to Western culture and reliant on tradition, they became movements in the service of the capitalist world against Bolshevism and subsequently against the socialist camp—from the green belt encircling Soviet socialism to the Mujahideen of Afghanistan, and in Iran as a successful movement that seized state power as a barrier against leftism. The characteristic of all these movements, especially in the last decades of the twentieth century, was the sympathy of the masses of the deprived people of these countries with Islamic movements. In all these countries, Islamic movements, as an alternative and replacement for communist and socialist movements, won the attention of the masses of the deprived. This was a success achieved by absorbing the class literature specific to communist and socialist movements and the ideological cover supporting the deprived classes of society, in connection with extensive charitable networks.
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The course of capitalist development over the past half century in all Middle Eastern countries helped bring about the decomposition of the movements of the previous era and schism within their ranks. For Islamic movements too, this was an inevitable course. Khomeini's Islam of the oppressed at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 turned into Khamenei's Islam of the elites later, until it finally turned into two Islams—the Islam of the oligarchs and coup-makers and the Islam of the street with class demands—into a movement in the process of disintegration. The glue of Islam and the Islamic ummah will not be able to preserve the unity of these forces. The Islamic movement that once united masses of the deprived in unity with the owners of capital against communist and socialist movements is today no longer able to preserve that unity. A course that had previously been traversed in Gaza and in the course of developments within Hamas was also slowly unfolding in Lebanon's Hezbollah, and only Israel's military strikes prevented its revelation.
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For Islamic countries, the result of this process will be the liberation of massive masses of deprived people from the domination of Islamic movements—masses that will attach ever greater importance to the primacy of the class question and will engage in explaining the world and in discerning friends from enemies along class lines. From a class perspective, this mass of working and toiling human beings will be drawn increasingly into confrontation with the dominant economic class and will thus seek answers to the conundrums of contemporary political economy—a course that will inevitably tend toward a critique of the foundations of capitalism. Signs of this course can be observed in street gatherings, in slogans and placards dedicated either to raising class demands or to critiquing the functioning of capital in the government, the parliament, and the chambers of commerce.
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What, however, distinguishes this mass of humanity from other protest movements of recent decades is its lack of inner connection with the political and ideological structures of the dominant international order. The dominance of democratic norms and rules over these movements has likewise, to this point, prevented these tendencies from unfolding into movements with a distinct identity. Yet this commitment to democratic rules takes place not on the basis of the fundamental inclination of these movements themselves, but on the basis of adherence to charismatic religious leadership. So long as the class rift has not completely separated the organized components of these movements from one another and placed them in opposition to each other, this charismatic leadership will be able to continue preventing the class-oriented tendencies at the foundations of the Islamic movement from unfolding into separate and independent movements. By contrast, to whatever extent objective, real contradictions place the holders of conflicting interests within Islamic movements in opposition to one another, to that same extent the charismatic leadership of these movements will be weakened and forced into an open orientation in favor of this or that side of the class struggle within its own camp.
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The effects of these material changes, previously discernible in the unity of action between Hamas and Islamic movements on the one hand and the fighters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the other, likewise surfaced in the course of the street movements in Iran. For the first time, the street became a place for the simultaneous and side-by-side presence of supporters of the Islamic system and of anti-imperialist, justice-seeking leftist activists and communists. This convergence and companionship in practice in recent months has in some cases been reflected in the views of adherents of the Islamic movement and even of Velayat-e faqih, who increasingly see themselves in contrast with the pillars of the system and position themselves alongside communist and justice-seeking leftist activists. What was observed in recent years with the formation of committees such as the Committee for Solidarity with Cuba by religious activists, or with the welcome extended by some religious channels to the practical action of leftist activists in the group for Palestine, entered a new level of relations based on class interests and transcending the boundaries of belief in the course of the street movement.
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From the perspective of contemporary communism, this is a new development. Once again, the possibility is provided for the emergence of a class-based communism free from the domination of all varieties of academic and human rights socialism and of every type of disaffected intellectual of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. The course of unfolding contradictions within the capitalist system has once again provided the possibility for a militant communism to arise within a new class coalition of workers and toilers whom the history of the twentieth century had placed in two hostile camps against each other. Just as French communism had to recognize the potential latent in the Yellow Vests movement in order to be able to confront new challenges, so too must communism in Iran and the Middle East recognize this potential protesting inequality and imperialist-Zionist aggression, and employ all its efforts to overcome the historical rift between the deprived masses. The young religious worker and toiler, the supporter of the system, should not today be rejected and treated with hostility because of anti-communism and the Islamic Republic's half-century of crimes against workers and communists. The matter of communism is primarily the class unity of the toilers, not their ideological affiliation. The unfolding of objective contradictions after the Al-Aqsa Flood and after the imperialist-Zionist aggressive war has now provided this possibility more than ever before: that workers and toilers who in the previous era had lined up in hostile movements against each other may today come to the field side by side in a common battle against the rule of capital. This is a struggle that must be organized today, and its obstacles must be overcome. Our fate goes hand in hand with our success in shaping this new class coalition.
Extraordinary Conference of the Communist Preparation Organization
22 Mehr 1405
October 14, 2026
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